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The first stage of the Trump administration's Middle East plan has elicited a collective sense of relief among EU officials. Following 24 months of bloodshed, the truce, captive exchanges, partial IDF pullback, and humanitarian access provide optimism – yet regrettably, create an excuse for European nations to persist with passivity.

The EU's Problematic Position on the Gaza Conflict

When it comes to the Gaza conflict, unlike the Russian aggression in Ukraine, European governments have revealed their worst colours. Deep divisions exist, leading to policy paralysis. More alarming than passivity is the accusation of complicity in Israel's war crimes. EU bodies have refused to exert pressure on those responsible while continuing commercial, diplomatic, and defense cooperation.

The breaches of international law have sparked widespread anger among the European public, yet European leaders have lost touch with their own people, particularly youth. In 2020, the EU spearheaded the climate agenda, responding to youth demands. These very young people are now appalled by their leaders' inaction over Gaza.

Belated Acknowledgement and Weak Actions

It took two years of a conflict that many consider a genocide for multiple EU countries including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden to recognise the Palestinian state, following Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia's lead from last year.

Just last month did the EU executive propose the first timid punitive measures toward Israel, including sanctioning radical officials and violent settlers, plus suspending European trade benefits. Nevertheless, both measures have been implemented. The initial requires complete consensus among 27 EU governments – unlikely given strong opposition from nations including Hungary and the Czech Republic. The second could pass with a qualified majority, but Germany and Italy's opposition have rendered it ineffective.

Divergent Responses and Lost Trust

This summer, the EU determined that Israel had breached its human rights commitments under the EU-Israel association agreement. But recently, the EU's foreign policy chief paused efforts to revoke the agreement's trade privileges. The contrast with the EU's multiple rounds of Russian sanctions could not be more pronounced. On Ukraine, Europe has stood tall for democracy and international law; on Gaza, it has shattered its reputation in the eyes of the world.

The US Initiative as an Convenient Excuse

Now, Trump's plan has offered Europe with an way out. It has allowed European governments to support Washington's demands, similar to their approach on Ukraine, defense, and trade. It has enabled them to promote a new dawn of stability in the Middle East, redirecting focus from sanctions toward European support for the US plan.

Europe has retreated into its familiar position of playing second fiddle to the US. While Arab and Muslim majority countries are expected to bear responsibility for an international stabilisation force in Gaza, European governments are preparing to participate with aid, rebuilding, administrative help, and frontier supervision. Talk of leveraging Israel has largely vanished.

Practical Obstacles and Geopolitical Constraints

All this is comprehensible. The US initiative is the sole existing proposal and undoubtedly the single approach with some possibility, however small, of success. This is not due to the inherent merit of the proposal, which is problematic at best. It is instead because the US is the sole actor with sufficient influence over Israel to alter behavior. Supporting US diplomacy is therefore both practical for European leaders, it makes sense too.

Nevertheless, implementing the plan after its first phase is more challenging than anticipated. Multiple hurdles and paradoxical situations exist. Israel is unlikely to fully pull out from Gaza unless Hamas lays down weapons. But Hamas will not surrender entirely unless Israel withdraws.

What Lies Ahead and Required Action

The plan aims to move toward local administration, first involving Palestinian technocrats and then a "restructured" governing body. But administrative reform means radically different things to the Americans, Europe, Arab countries, and the Palestinians themselves. Israel opposes this entity altogether and, with it, the idea of a Palestinian state.

Israel's leadership has been brutally clear in repeating its consistent objective – the destruction of Hamas – and has carefully evaded discussing an end to the war. It has not completely adhered to the ceasefire: since it came into effect, dozens of non-combatants have been killed by Israeli forces, while additional individuals have been shot by Hamas.

Without the global community, and especially the US and Europe, apply more leverage on Israel, the odds are that mass violence will resume, and Gaza – as well as the West Bank – will continue being occupied. In short, the outstanding elements of the initiative will not see the light of day.

Conclusion

Therefore European leaders are wrong to view backing the US initiative and leveraging Israel as separate or opposing. It is politically convenient but practically incorrect to see the first as part of the paradigm of peace and the second to one of ongoing conflict. This is not the moment for the EU and its member states to avoid responsibility, or to abandon the initial cautious steps toward punitive measures and conditionality.

Pressure exerted on Israel is the sole method to surmount diplomatic obstacles, and if this is achieved, Europe can finally make a modest – but constructive, at least – contribution to stability in the Middle East.